Approved For Release 2020704 STERR 2 100975 A004300080001-5 25X1 5 March 1959 Copy No. C 63 CENTRAI INTELLIGEN BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS DECLASSIFIED CLASS, CHANGED TO: TS

State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET



Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A00430008050415 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 5 March 1959 25X1 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-UK: Foreign Secretary Lloyd has told Ambassador 25 Thompson that he and Macmillan have become convinced that Khrushchev is running the show and there is little point in talking to anyone else. Even Mikoyan was careful to take his cues from Khrushchev. The British take credit for inducing 10 the Soviet leaders to "agree" to a foreign ministers' meeting under certain conditions. Lloyd implied that although the Soviet agenda proposals were unsatisfactory the West might con-25X1 sider accepting them. The British were impressed by the "extraordinary sensitivity" of the Soviet leaders which they found combined with "a lack of understanding of the sensibilities of 25X1 others." 1 25X1

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1		II. ASIA-AFRICA	*	25X1		
		II. ASIA-AFRICA		25X1		
70	Watch Committee conclusionMiddle East: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet hostile action which would jeopardize US interests exist in the Middle East, particularly in Iran and Iraq. The situations in the area remain precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-scale hostilities is unlikely in the immediate future.  Iran: Current tensions between Iran and the USSR can be expected to continue and, with the signing of the Iranian-US bilateral, to increase to a point short of direct military action.  Jordan: The scheduled absence from Jordan of King Hussein beginning on 8 March and Prime Minister Rifai beginning on 17 March					
	5 Mar 59	DAILY BRIEF	ii 1			
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25)	the government re elements. <u>Sudan</u> : The r underscores the i by outside elemen	nity for political competition emaining in Amman and for resignation of the Supreme nstability of the governmen ats.	coups by opposition  Council in the Sudan	25) Y ]
		III. THE WEST		
No	decision to withdre his dissatisfaction Western tripartite genuine coordinate African policy and sion to use nucleathey would reconstor tripartite coordinate will still probably	O: (High French officials at raw the Mediterranean Fleen with the response to France global policy coordination ion would involve US backing a voice for France in any ar weapons. Although the Fider withdrawal of the fleet redination are treated more insist on changes within Neders comparable to that of the same in the same is the same in th	t from NATO to ce's proposals for Paris holds that ing for France's North US or British decirench now indicate if their proposals favorably, De Gaulle ATO to give France	25X1
40	out further anti-A some provincial of seems to have se promising a plan	4 March demonstrations in merican rioting, but tension cities. Some public reactions in and President Siles' specifier supporting the nation by a restore his moderate lead	on continues high in on against violence peech of 3 March vits own resources	] <sup>25</sup>
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	5 Mar 59	DAILY BRIEF	iii	
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## III. THE WEST

France Ties Withdrawal of Fleet From NATO to De Gaulle's Tripartite Policy Proposals  French Ambassador Alphand has informed the State Department that he believed Paris would "indefinitely" postpone notifying NATO of intent to withdraw the Mediterranean Fleet if its proposals for tripartite Western global policy coordination were received more favorably. He and other high French officials have described De Gaulle as "profoundly shocked" by the US abstention on the Algerian resolution in the UN last December, and have stressed this as the root of the French decision.	25X1
The French representative to NATO held out no hope that De Gaulle would change his decision on the fleet. He said the whole question went back to the lack of progress in the tripartite discussions in Washington on coordination of policy. He said the greatest difficulty lay in "who held the keys" to the use of nuclear weapons.	] 25X1
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## THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior

The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

United States Information Agency

The Director

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